We examine a dynamic experimentation problem in which managers make a binary choice that influences the information available to investors. We model a manager's multi-period problem of discretionary disclosures of the persistent component of earnings, when disclosure of current earnings is mandatory. We establish that there exists a partial disclosure equilibrium characterized by a disclosure threshold, such that disclosures arise if and only if the information is above the threshold. This disclosure threshold is increasing in the mean and decreasing in the variance of earnings. Further, the threshold can either increase or decrease over time.
I. Introduction
Prior literature investigates the role of mandatory disclosures in a single period setting by characterizing what disclosures would arise voluntarily in the absence of disclosure requirements.
For example, in a single period setting, Dye (1985) examines a manager's discretionary disclosure policy to maximize the firm value when he is sometimes uninformed. The paper documents that the manager will strategically withhold his information when he is informed and the news is unfavorable relative to an equilibrium threshold value. In this paper, we formalize an extension of this model to a multi-period setting where the manager faces the disclosure decision (to disclose or not to disclose)
in each period in anticipation of his future disclosure decisions. In our setting, a manager, with some probability, privately observes information related to the publicly observable signal (say earnings)
at the end of each period. Upon observing his information, which we label the persistent component of earnings, the manager has discretion over credibly disclosing this information to the owners of the firm (investors). Alternatively, if the manager does not observe this information, he cannot credibly disclose that he is uninformed. Consequently, managers make their voluntary disclosure regarding their private information about future profits, in a context where the disclosure of this period's earnings is mandatory. 1 We show how the manager's disclosure decision is affected by two key elements of the firm's dynamic environment. First, the payoff to the investors has both a persistent and transitory component. Second, the manager may or may not possess information about the persistent component of the payoff. Since the probability that the manager is informed about the persistent shock is characterized by a discrete Markov process, the investors estimate this probability given the manager chooses to not reveal information about the persistent shock to the investors. Thus, the manager's problem is an optimal experimentation problem in which the choice variable is binary.
The manager's optimal choice is characterized by a critical value of the persistent component of the payoff which is dependent on its conditional probability distribution. Above this critical value the manager informs the investors. The conditional probability of the persistent shock depends on the history of informed choices by the manager. This formulation allows us to identify sufficient conditions under which disclosures over time become more likely (disclosure cutoff decreases over time) as well as conditions under which disclosures over time become less likely (disclosure cutoff decreases over time). The former result was conjectured by Jung and Kwon (1988) based on a single period model and assuming an exogenously imposed mean-preserving spread. In our paper the mean-preserving spread arises endogenously. Further, the latter result is a new contribution.
As in Jung and Kwon an increase in uncertainty reduces the critical value of the persistent component leading to more likely disclosure. In a dynamic setting, the longer period of time the manager makes no disclosures, the higher is the investors' uncertainty about the persistent part of earnings. In addition, every time the manager chooses to disclose, the variance of the persistent shock reverts to the minimum level. As a result, the manager does not disclose for a period of time until the uncertainty has built up to a critical level which leads to a fall in the critical value of the persistent shock. The manager proceeds to disclose and the uncertainty reverts to the minimum level.
The critical value of the persistent shock now increases leading to a new time period in which the manager finds it optimal not to disclose the information. Thus we are able to identify the optimal solution to the manager's problem in which the sequence of optimal discretionary choices are characterized over time.
Our paper has three main contributions. First, we propose a stylized dynamic setting where earnings follow autoregressive processes and a Markov structure links the probability that the manager is informed in one period to whether the manager was informed in the previous period.
Since this setting allows us to derive closed form solutions of the manager's disclosure decision, we can formalize and confirm conjectures from the existing literature regarding the current disclosure decision's effect on the manager's future propensity to disclose. In doing so we rely on solution techniques from Balvers and Cosimano (1993) to characterize the optimal disclosure decision of a manger and illustrate how this information structure would influence the choice problem over time.
In addition, we offer a constructive proof of manager's disclosure strategy, develop closed form solutions, and derive comparative statics.
Our second contribution arises from confirmation in our multi-period setting of existing comparative static results derived in a single period setting. These comparative statics relate the manager's choice of disclosure threshold to the expected future earnings, the standard deviation of future earnings, and the investors' assessment of the likelihood that the manager remains informed and remains uninformed. In addition to confirming robustness of existing results, we provide a new result that disclosures over time may become more likely, that is, the manager's disclosure cutoff may decrease over time.
Third, the framework and technology proposed in this paper can facilitate a dynamic analysis of the following issues, all of which are about optimal experimentation when the decision maker has a binary choice. Some examples include a bank determining whether or not to monitor a borrower [Diamond, 1991] ; a central bank deciding whether or not to reveal a change in monetary policy [Cosimano and VanHuyck, 1993] ; a worker deciding whether or not to accept a job offer [Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000] ; an individual deciding whether to be productive or a predator [Grossman and Kim, 2002] ; a firm deciding whether or not to engage in honest dealings with another firm/employee [Chami and Fullenkamp, 2002] ; and whether or not to seek information and enforcement from private intermediaries in a repeated game setting with insufficient information on potential cheating by one of the players [Dixit, 2001] . Some common threads in all of these settings and our model include a payoff for each period, a binary decision each period arising out of three underlying attributes and an endogenous flow of information over time for improving inference of the underlying attribute. The approach of our paper may help in analyzing each of the issues above in a dynamic setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we position this paper relative to prior studies on the topic of disclosures in general and discretionary disclosures in particular. In section III, we set up a model in which the earnings contain both a persistent shock and a temporary shock. Initially we construct a model where disclosure occurred in the prior period (Scenario 1). Subsequently, we specify the case where there was no disclosure in the prior period (Scenario 2). The results for each of these scenarios are presented in section IV. These results are then shown to hold in a dynamic setting with multiple periods. We demonstrate the existence of an optimal cut-off for each period. In addition, we also show that this optimal cut-off changes endogenously with endogenous changes in the conditional mean and variance of the persistent shock.
The last section contains a discussion of the results and results from a simulation of the problem.
1 Verrecchia [1983] shows that partial disclosure equilibria arise when managers use firm's funds to disclose.
II. Disclosures and Discretionary Disclosures
The economic analysis of disclosures at its most fundamental level investigates voluntary disclosures. Even though provision of information, such as publicly traded companies' financial statements, is mandatory, this economic approach is motivated by the observation that we can only assess the effect of mandatory disclosures relative to the disclosures that would have arisen in the absence of such regulation. In an early paper, Akerlof [1970] demonstrates that when firm managers cannot disclose their type (quality), markets may break down in the sense that only the worst type of firm is offered for sale to prospective investors. Subsequently, Grossman [1981] and Milgrom [1981] show that managers always disclose voluntarily if investors know that managers possess information and that all disclosures are truthful and credible. This setting leaves no role for mandated disclosures. Dye [1985] shows that the Grossman-Milgrom result does not extend to the case where prospective shareholders are uncertain about whether the manager is uninformed.
2 When there is some exogenous probability that the manager is uninformed (which he cannot credibly disclose) then rational prospective shareholders cannot maintain the belief that no disclosure means that the firm is of the worst type. Consequently, there exists a partial disclosure equilibrium. Any partial disclosure equilibrium is characterized by a cut-off or threshold value that investors infer correctly.
In equilibrium, an informed manager does not disclose voluntarily for firm profits below this cut-off, but discloses voluntarily for profits above the cut-off. Building on Dye [1985] , Jung and Kwon [1988] demonstrate that an exogenously imposed mean preserving spread of shareholders' assessment of firm value leads to increased disclosures.
In this paper, we extend Dye [1985] and Jung and Kwon [1988] to encompass multiple periods and capture a setting where dispersion in the beliefs of prospective investors arises endogenously over time. We assume that firm profitability has both persistent and transitory components and these components change over time as a result of random shocks to them. We depart from the existing literature by assuming that there are two signals in each period. Let the first signal be of earnings, the disclosure of which is mandatory. Let the second signal be about the persistent component of earnings that is private information of the manager, the disclosure of which is voluntary. Consistent with Dye (1985) , we assume that there is some chance that the manager cannot discern the persistent component of earnings. Following prior literature, we use the term discretionary disclosures to have two implications: First, whether or not a manager discloses in any given period, has no effect on the realization of payoffs in future periods. Second, equilibria in which the manager is committed to either always disclosing or never disclosing, are precluded. To illustrate, always telling the truth is not credibly enforceable since, in any given period, investors prefer that an informed manager, who observes unfavorable news, withholds this information.
In this setting, we analyze incentives for voluntary disclosure of management forecasts of future profitability. The optimal inter-temporal strategy for such disclosures changes with the announcement of current earnings since the conditional distribution of the persistent component of future earnings is optimally adjusted by both the managers and the investors. For example, a failure to disclose increases the variance of this conditional distribution which, in turn, lowers the critical cut-off. 2 x t is the deviation from a known unconditional mean, which has been subtracted out.
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III. The Model
Consider an infinite horizon setting in which the manager of a firm and its risk-neutral shareholders share at the beginning of the first period common prior beliefs regarding the future evolution of earnings. At the end of each period, the output, x t , say earnings, is announced and therefore available to all shareholders and the manager. During each period, the manager first observes x t and subsequently observes, with some probability, the persistent component of earnings in period t, 2 t . Upon receipt, the manager can make, at his discretion, a credible announcement about the private information regarding earnings (see Figure 1 ). The manager, however, cannot make a credible assertion that he has received no information. We define an indicator function, D t for period t as follows: 0 -the manager does not disclose, 1 -discloses. Following Dye [1985] , we assume that the firm's shareholders unanimously agree to a disclosure strategy which maximizes firm value at any time t, and the manager, being compensated on a fixed salary, adopts this policy. In Table 1 we model the probability that the manager is uninformed in any period t as a Markov Chain with transition matrix: 3 Our equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We cannot use the sequential equilibrium, because trembles are not properly defined. See Fudenberg and Tirole [1991] . (II) The firm's disclosure strategy as a function of the manager's information at time t that specifies whether the manager will disclose or not.
The belief functions must have the property that for any outcome that can occur with positive probability given the equilibrium strategy, the beliefs must be formed based on prior beliefs using Bayes' rule. The disclosure strategy must maximize the manager's objective function given the equilibrium belief functions.
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At time t-1, shareholders expect that one of the following three mutually exclusive events, A t , B t and C t , will be realized in period t. First, the manager is likely to be uninformed and cannot make a disclosure. We refer to this event as A t . Second, event B t refers to the manager being informed but electing not to disclose. Third, event C t occurs when the manager is informed and elects to disclose. We will show that the manager's disclosure decision is characterized by a threshold value of disclosure, y t , such that if the persistent shock during period t, g t = y t , an informed manager is indifferent between disclosing or withholding information. Furthermore, the informed manager prefers to disclose good news, that is, g t > y t ; and elects not to disclose bad news, that is,
Given the disclosure decision of period t-1, we now calculate the probabilities that the shareholders assess for the three events, under two scenarios, one where disclosure occurred in the previous period and the other where there was no disclosure in the previous period. First consider Scenario 1 where disclosure occurred in the prior period denoted by C t-1 in the Figure 2 .
At time t-1 the manager observes the persistent shock since we know the manager disclosed the information. Consequently, the top row of the transition matrix in Table 1 is applicable. We will calculate Pr{, t # y t } within the manager's optimal disclosure problem. By Bayes Rule we can calculate the probability of events A and B given there is no disclosure at time t. Following a voluntary disclosure, event C t-1 , there is no information asymmetry between the managers and shareholders. Following no disclosure, shareholders' beliefs about the manager's cut-off determine the shareholders' assessment of the likelihood that the manager was informed or uninformed. The probability corresponding to A t-1 fully captures this value-relevant information. We report these probabilities in Table 2 . We now consider Scenario 2 of no disclosure by the manager in period t-1. No disclosure in the prior period could either have been due to the manager being uninformed (A t-1 ) or due to the manager withholding private information (B t-1 ). The likelihood of A t-1 and B t-1 are dependent on the history of disclosure up until period t-1. Starting from either of these events, Figure 3 presents the unfolding of various events in period t. Starting from event A t-1 , the manager does not know the persistent shock at time t-1 so that the bottom row of Table 1 gives the transition probabilities.
Given the persistent shock at time t there are three possible events. In the bottom of Figure 3 we begin at event B t-1 in which the manager knows the persistent shock so that the top row of Table 1 is appropriate for the transition probabilities. Again given the realization of the persistent shock at time t there are three possible events.
We can use Figure 3 to construct the probabilities of each event conditional on disclosure at time t-1 using Bayes Rule and the Markov transition matrix in Table 1 . These conditional probabilities are reported in Table 3 [ ] The firm's value at time t, V, depends on the history of disclosure through time t-1 and the shareholders' belief function at time t-1. In our model, the belief functions can be fully characterized by (i) shareholders' expected value of next period's earnings; (ii) the shareholders' variance on their estimate of the next period's dividend, and, (iii) the probability of event A t-1 given no disclosure in the previous period. Define the value function at time t given disclosure at time t-1 as the solution to the manager's problem:
For the manger's problem we need to know E[x t+j * H t-1 ]. By (1) and (2) 
Now expectations of future random shocks cannot be influenced by the past history of disclosure and current disclosure policy by the manager, since the manager has currently no information to convey about the future shocks. Thus, expected earnings reduce to E[x t+j
The shareholders need only forecast the persistent component of earnings, since neither the manager nor the shareholders have any information about the future shocks to earnings. The value of the firm is now so that the firm value is equal to current earnings plus discounted value of shareholders' forecast of the persistent component of earnings.
Finally, the future disclosures will have no influence on the current forecast of the current persistent shock, since the future disclosures will not be determined until the future shocks are revealed to the manager. As a result, the current stock price will depend only on current disclosure policy and the history of disclosure.
IV. Results
Our analysis of the manager's problem will be constructive in that it will be built step by step.
We start with the case in which disclosure occurred at time t-1 so that we are in Scenario 1. In this case, we will prove the existence of a critical threshold , y t , such that the manager discloses whenever the persistent shock exceeds this threshold. Given the cut-off at time t we will then proceed to the case when no disclosure occurs at time t (the persistent shock is less than the critical value). We do not consider the case of disclosure at time t since the analysis at time t+1 would be identical to the analysis in the previous step. In this case, we can prove the existence of the critical y t+1 at time t+1.
We then use induction to generalize the result. Assuming that there is a critical y t+J at time t+J, we prove that there exists a critical y t+J+1 in the next time period. 4 The order, in which we apply the components of the time t information, reduces to the order in which we integrate over the random variables. At each point in time the random variables consist of the continuous variables, g and u, as well as the discrete variables which measure whether or not the manager is informed and discloses. By calculating the conditional expectation in two steps we are first integrating over the continuous random variables followed by integration over the discrete random variables. Since, these variables are represented by integrable functions the order of integration is irrelevant.
[
Scenario 1.
Under Scenario 1, when the manager disclosed in the previous period, this fact is the only relevant part of the history of disclosure so the stock price becomes
The stock price is maximized by choosing the disclosure policy that maximize the forecast of the persistent shock. From Scenario 1 (Table 2) we have
To solve this problem the shareholders and manager must calculate the conditional expectations of the persistent shock, g t . This conditional expectation has two components to it. First, the manager discloses the earnings, x t , which contains a garbled signal of the persistent shock.
Second, the manager decides whether or not to disclose the persistent shock. Our analysis below shows that this decision truncates the support of the distribution for the persistent shock given no disclosure. It turns out that it is easier to calculate the expectation of 
The following lemma will be useful in the calculation of the first conditional expectations. Scenario 1 can be viewed as the setting of Jung and Kwon (1988) except that we restrict our analysis to normal distributions but allow for current discretionary disclosure decision to be made in anticipation of future disclosure decisions. Consequently, it is not surprising that the comparative static results are qualitatively the same. First, an increase in the mean causes an equal increase in the disclosure threshold (as in Jung and Kwon, proposition 3) but leaves the probability of disclosure unaffected. Second, an increase in the variance decreases the disclosure threshold (as in Jung and Kwon, proposition 3). Third, an increase in the probability of the event, that the manager is currently informed (p 22 ), decreases the disclosure threshold (as in Jung and Kwon, proposition 2) and leads to more frequent disclosures. Since the disclosures are discretionary, there is essentially no effect from the future. Hence under Scenario 1, where the manager was informed in the prior period, a 6 Notice from 
change in the conditional probability on being uninformed in the previous period (p 11 ) has no effect on the current disclosure threshold.
Scenario 2.
We can now move to the next step in which the manager does not disclose at time t. In this case the firm's value function becomes
Here, the conditional expectation of g t is not influenced by the disclosure decision at time t+1, but it will be influenced by the new information in x t+1 , i.e., Pr .
The conditional expectations of g t is updated with the arrival of x t+1 by Lemma 1. However, y t does not change since the manager does not go back and disclose the shock g t at time t+1. Thus, the manager's decision to disclose at time t+1 boils down to
Here, H t+1 = {D t-1 =1, D t =0, D t+1 =0} is the history of disclosure.
In the problem (9), the manager needs to calculate the conditional expectations of Table 3 .
Proof: Proof of the existence of y t+1 is contained in the appendix and follows Proposition 1. The partial derivatives are found by taking the total differentiation of the implicit function based on (11).
Multi-Period Generalization.
We can now move to a general case in which the manager has not disclosed for J periods. We will prove the general existence of a cut-off using a proof by induction. Assuming that y t+J exists and is unique, we demonstrate there exists a unique cut-off y t+J+1 such that D t+J+1 = 0 when
The value of the firm's stock, given the history H t+J ={D t-1 = 1,D t = 0,...,D t+J = 0} is
The disclosure at time D t+J+1 does not effect the conditional expectation of
However, these conditional expectations will be updated by the arrival of information in x t+J+1 , i.e., If there is an unanticipated change in p 11 at time t+J+1 and subsequent periods, then
If there is an unanticipated change in p 22 at time t+J+1 and subsequent periods, then
Proof: Is identical to Proposition 3 given the optimal policy y t+j exists and is unique.
Corollary 1.
Given the initial conditions, there exist parameter values such that (a) Non-disclosure in every period is not an optimal disclosure strategy and (b) Always disclosing is not an optimal disclosure strategy.
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By Proposition 4 there exists a critical y t within each period such that disclosure occurs if the random draw of the persistent shock exceeds this critical value, then it is optimal to disclose so that result (a) is true. On the other hand, if the random shock to the persistent shock is less than the critical value, then it is optimal not to disclose so that (b) is true.
Corollary 2. If a.) the underlying variance of earnings is positive, and b.) there is non-zero firstorder autocorrelation, then Pr{y t < y t+1 } > 0.
At any given time period t+1 the critical threshold, y t , in the previous period is determined by the previous disclosure policy of the manager. By proposition 4 the critical threshold, y t+1 , at 9 The probability of a series of low random shocks like this simulation is of course very low. time t+1 will increase whenever the conditional mean of , t+1 increases or its conditional variance falls. The condition mean in (13) increases whenever the new observation exceeds the previous conditional mean of x t+1 . The conditional variance falls to its minimum whenever there is disclosure by the manager. Both of these events have a positive probability. Thus, there is a positive probability that the critical value increases from one period to another.
Simulation Results
The full implications of Propositions 1 to 4 are hidden because of the dynamic characteristic of the manager's disclosure policy. To illustrate these results, we report in three panels (see Figure   4 ) the result of one simulation in which no disclosure happened for 19 consecutive periods.
9 This simulation corresponds to parameters Table   3 . The final panel shows the movement of stock prices which is always declining in this case since the persistent shock is always below the cut-off value for disclosure.
The first observation in these panels represents Scenario 1 and the results in Proposition 1 and 2. In simulations not shown we find that the cut-off generally increases when the persistent shock is higher, since the conditional mean of this shock increases by (5). We also find that the cutoff falls whenever the variance of the persistent or temporary shock increases. This follows from (5) since the conditional variance of the persistent shock increases in these cases. Finally if the manager is more likely to be informed about the persistent shock (p 22 increases), then the critical cut-off falls, since no disclosure leads investors to increase the likelihood that the shock is bad news.
As pointed out above these results in the first period are identical to the results found by Jung and Kwon [1988] . The insights gained from the analysis of the manager's multi-period problem is represented by looking at the results during the last 19 periods. Since the epsilon is always below its contemporary disclosure threshold, no disclosure happened in the 19 periods reported. Consequently, we are under Scenario 2 and Propositions 3 and 4. Corollary 1 and 2 are also relevant. Although one might have expected the disclosure threshold to decrease monotonically over time, it increases from one period to the next in 7 out of the 19 realizations. This is caused by the information content of the public signal on the latent persistent component of earnings. A clear result from the first panel is that the cut-off is positively correlated with the persistent shock to earnings. When this shock is higher the conditional mean of this shock increases by (13). By Proposition 4 this higher conditional mean of the persistent shock causes the cut-off to increase by the same amount. Proposition 4 this higher conditional mean of the persistent shock causes the cutoff to increase by the same amount.
The second panel illustrates the evolution of the investors' assessment with regard to two items: 1) The probability that the manager is uninformed, event A t .
2) The conditional variance of the persistent earnings. Both of these variables move independent of the random shocks. They are dependent on whether or not the manager discloses during this period. In this simulation the manager does not disclose, so that the underlying uncertainty increases. This increase in uncertainty generally causes a decrease in the cut-off and a decrease in the stock price as shown in panel 3. There are two ways this uncertainty increases. First, the conditional variance of the persistent shock increases each time the manager does not disclose, although eventually it does approach a steady 10 This effect is generally non-monotonic when p 11 + p 22 … 1. It turns out that the probability of event A is constant if p 11 + p 22 = 1. state of between .8 and .9. In each period the investor knows that the total earnings, x, is composed of both persistent and temporary shocks. The investor, knowing this, apportions some of this uncertainty to the variability of the persistent shock. Second, the probability that the manager does not know, event A t , goes up. From Figure 3 we know that this occurs because of higher p 11 or lower p 22 , which increase the chance that the manager does not know the persistent shock in the next period. Proposition 4 shows that both these events increase the cut-off, since investors attach less significance to the fact that the manager does not disclose. In addition, panel 2 shows that the probability of event A moves endogenously over time. This result follows from the complex interaction between the Markov process in Table 1 and the history of disclosure through the updating of the probability of event A by Bayes Rule in Table 3 . 10 The results of these simulations illustrate that the optimal disclosure cut-off changes endogenously over time. Under reasonable parameter values, the disclosure threshold may decrease or increase over time as the conditional expectation of the persistent shock to earnings decreases or increases. This cut-off increases whenever the current realization of the persistent shock is higher relative to the prior conditional mean of the investor last period. This cut-off decreases whenever the underlying uncertainty about this shock increases. This uncertainty increases either because the manager failed to disclose in the previous period or there is a larger chance the manager is informed but chooses not to disclose.
V. Conclusion
We use the voluntary disclosure of accounting information by a manager to illustrate how discretionary choices can be characterized over time. Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) consider discretionary disclosure in a single period setting. Our first scenario, which assumes that disclosure occurred in the previous period, differs from their setting in two important respects. First, while disclosure of earnings is mandatory managers can make additional discretionary disclosures of the persistent component of earnings. Second, managers make the current discretionary disclosure decision anticipating the opportunity for discretionary disclosures in future periods. We establish the robustness of existence and uniqueness of comparative static results to both these features. In particular, we find that always disclosing and never disclosing are not equilibrium disclosure strategies. Further, we prove that there exists a unique threshold which characterizes a partial disclosure equilibrium. In this partial disclosure equilibrium, we show that an increase in the expected value of earnings or a sudden decrease in the probability that the manager is informed (p 22 ) increases the disclosure threshold. Finally, we find that a decrease in the variance of earnings increases the disclosure threshold so that the stock price increases.
Our second scenario, which assumes that disclosure did not occur in the previous period, introduces a third feature to the manager's problem. Managers make the discretionary disclosure decision contingent on the history of mandatory earnings disclosures since the last discretionary disclosure of the persistent component of earnings, that is, past discretionary disclosures, affect the current discretionary disclosure decision. This arises because investors' interpretation of current and past earnings is conditioned on the absence or presence of discretionary disclosures, as well as the information embedded in the history of earnings revealed since the last voluntary disclosure. Over time, investor uncertainty builds in the absence of discretionary disclosures (corroborating the persistence of mandatory earnings disclosures). In particular, for each period the investor apportions a percentage of the uncertainty in earnings to the persistent shock so that uncertainty builds without
Our analysis provides insights in to the dynamics of voluntary disclosures taking as given that some disclosure is mandatory in each period. For example, we identify conditions under which disclosures are more likely (cut-off decreases) over time as uncertainty builds up with no discretionary disclosures over several periods. Our analysis does not address whether mandatory disclosure increases social welfare. We have focused on the impact of mandatory disclosure on the current shareholders, who may wish to sell their shares, not the new shareholders or the long term shareholders. Our analysis makes it feasible to address this question in future research.
The analysis developed in this paper can facilitate several issues where the agent makes a discrete choice which alters the information available to others. There are several characteristics of the problem which must be maintained for the analysis to transfer to these examples. First, the payoff each period is subject to both a temporary and persistent shock, yet the other person cannot identify the individual components of the payoff. Next, the decision maker may or may not be informed about the value of the persistent shock. This assumption rules out the extreme case in which the decision to provide information is always chosen. The temporary and persistent shocks are assumed to be normally distributed, while the probability of the agent being informed is a Markov process.
The distribution assumptions ensure that the expected payoff each period has the Markov property, so that only the current discrete choice influences the conditional distributions of all future payoffs.
In addition the current discrete choice has no influence on the conditional distribution of all future innovations in the payoffs.
The optimal discrete choice compares the expected discounted value of payoffs under both scenarios. The information disclosed when doing so yields a higher perceived value to the payoffs in equilibrium. The agent chooses to disclose when the persistent shock is above a critical value.
This critical value increases if there is an increase in the conditional mean of the persistent shock which follows from an increase in the current payoff. This critical value decreases when there is an increase in the conditional variance which occurs as long as the agent follows the uninformative decision. Finally this critical value increases when there is an increase in the probability that the agent is not informed about the persistent shock First, if disclosure occurred in the previous period, then the current disclosure threshold is determined by By 
[ ] Take as given disclosure thresholds in previous periods. If disclosure did not occur in the previous period then the current disclosure threshold is determined by substituting from Table 3 , we find that The conditional distribution of , used in this last step must be integrable so that we can apply integration by parts. All the conditional distributions derived in the text have this property, so that the argument can be applied to both proposition 3 and 4. Thus we have the existence of critical y for all time periods.
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The comparative static analysis follows the same logic as Proposition 2. We set up the implicit function based on (15) We then take the total differentiation of this implicit function and calculate the partial derivatives in Proposition 4 based on the Implicit Function Theorem. This theorem holds, since
The last term in this partial derivative is zero at the optimal decision, which reflects the Envelope Theorem. Thus, the Jacobian is always non-zero so that an implicit function, satisfying (A1), exist.
In addition, the partial derivatives in Propositions 4 and 5 are found by taking the derivative of (A1) with respect to the four parameters. Q.E.D. The logical development of the argument in this article does not depend upon the order of the stochastic process for 2 . For example suppose the stochastic process is an AR(2).
Following Sargent (1989, p.185 ) earnings at t+j is given by
If the last disclosure occurred at time t-1 then 2 t-1 is known to the shareholders. Then at time t the information set is just , t + u t , so that the analysis under Scenario 1 is identical to that in the text.
When we proceed to the next time period t+1 in Scenario 2 the information is the same except the constants are different values. Again the proof is the same although the notation becomes more cumbersome.
More general linear stochastic processes would be handled in the same way. First obtain a general expression for earnings in terms of shocks from the time of disclosure until the time the manager's disclosure decision is made. Then sequentially apply the analysis in the article.
